



Road to Sibiu

#EURoad2Sibiu

European  
Commission

European **Political  
Strategy** Centre

## Transnational Lists

### Can They Deliver on Their Promise?

February 2017

Today, seven in ten Europeans feel they are citizens of the European Union.<sup>1</sup> As such, they have the right to move freely, reside and work across the EU. They also have the right to vote in and run as candidates in European Parliament elections. And yet, the reality remains that **there are no 'EU' candidates in 'European' elections. There are no 'EU' votes.**

A Pole cannot vote for a Swede, unless the Swede is running in Poland. A citizen residing and voting in Malta cannot vote for a candidate from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe group – for lack of a corresponding political party in that country. And, all too often, even the political debates leading up to the European elections are not truly European, but remain focused on domestic issues.

The idea of transnational lists in elections to the European Parliament has been floated as a potential solution to this situation. **By creating an EU-wide constituency** – wherein voters could vote directly for 'European' candidates, regardless of their regional or national constituencies – transnational lists could **enhance the European dimension of the European elections.** Twenty years after the concept first emerged, it has, in recent months, been extensively debated. This is mainly due to the opportunity presented by Brexit: freeing up 73 seats – which could possibly be allocated

*If it were to happen: How would it work? Who would run? Would more Europeans vote? And who could end up being elected?*

to transnational lists – would leave room to experiment with the scheme without having to embark on a cumbersome reform of the Treaties.

But even with this window of opportunity, the clock is ticking. Decisions would need to be taken urgently, both by the Member States and the European Parliament.

And if it were to happen: How would it work? Who would run? Would more Europeans vote? And who could end up being elected?

**'I also have sympathy for the idea of having transnational lists in European elections – though I am aware this is an idea more than a few of you disagree with.'** – *European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union Speech, 13 September 2017.*

The creation of a Europe-wide constituency would represent a symbolically important stride forward in the EU's institutional development, but it does not come without questions and complexities. In the end, these must be solved through political compromise – just as major breakthroughs in European integration have always been achieved.

#### Disclaimer

The #EURoad2Sibiu Series is part of an ongoing project by the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC) to intellectually accompany the work of the European institutions in setting out a path for the future of the EU at 27 in the run-up to the Leaders' Summit in Sibiu in May 2019. The Series will shed light on a number of initiatives that were identified as priorities in European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker's State of the Union address and/or have been included on the Leader's Agenda. The views expressed in these papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European Commission.

## Making European elections more European

As the European Union prepares to relaunch itself as a Union of twenty-seven members in 2019, **the time is ripe to reflect on how to further strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the organisation** by renewing the bond with citizens.

Today, many Europeans feel that they have little or no power of choice over how the EU is run and the complexity and opacity of the EU's institutional setup has certainly contributed to the perception of a democratic deficit. The main ambition underpinning the idea of transnational lists is therefore to breathe new life into European politics by **strengthening the direct link between European citizens and their European Parliament**, thereby further consolidating the dual source of democratic legitimacy of the EU as a whole.

### A Parliament for the 'Union's citizens'

Transnational lists have been proposed as a logical and necessary response to the amendment brought forward with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, whereby the European Parliament is no longer composed of the representatives of 'the peoples of the States', but of the **'the Union's citizens'**.<sup>2</sup>

The idea is clear: **the European Parliament is not destined to be the forum for territorial representation but for the representation of all European citizens**. This line of thinking is fully aligned with the principle of dual democratic legitimacy that is at the heart of the Union's institutional set-up, according to which, on the one hand, citizens designate and hold accountable their national representatives to the Union (i.e. the European Council and the Council) through

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national elections, and, on the other hand, designate and hold accountable their European representatives through elections to the European Parliament (Figure 2).

The logical extension of this argument would also be that **European parties should become the representatives of the Union's citizens, rather than of national parties**. To date, while European parties attempt to be more than the sum of their national constituents, they remain for the most part, primarily composed of national parties, not of individual members.

## Strengthening the weaker link: European political parties

In spite of efforts of European political parties to create a bridge between European institutions and European citizens, **European parliamentary elections have remained largely national affairs**. They are dominated by national political parties, which nominate national candidates and run their electoral campaigns on a national level, according to different procedures. Even the voting day may differ across EU Member States. The European agenda tends to be pushed to the margins of the political debate.<sup>3</sup> Whilst there are many reasons for this, not least because the same European issue may be weighed differently by different national publics, and where one question may be of interest in one national context, it may be of none in others. European political parties have very little influence on the outcome of the European elections. There are even serious barriers for them to campaign within Member States.<sup>4</sup>

Attempts to strengthen European political parties by establishing a European legal statute for them and through increased funding have not sufficed to make them fully live up to the role attributed by the Treaties – namely that they should 'contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union' (Article 10 (4) TEU).<sup>5</sup>

*Political parties by giving them a more prominent role during European election campaigning periods. Transnational lists could help to fill the existing void of meaningful political debate on European integration and European policy choices that has created excessive distance between European citizens and European politics*

**The introduction of transnational lists therefore appears as a promising avenue to strengthen the role of European political parties** by giving them a more prominent role during European election campaigning periods. Transnational lists could help to **fill the existing void of meaningful political debate on European integration and European policy choices** that has created excessive distance between European citizens and European politics.<sup>6</sup>


## Building a new generation of European leaders: the role of transnational campaigns

There is today a growing demand for debate on Europe – 56 % of European citizens say that they are 'interested' in European affairs (Figure 1)<sup>7</sup> – a number which exceeds the earlier historic high of 54% in 1989.<sup>8</sup> In this context, **transnational campaigning** could serve to create a platform where future options for the European

project can be debated, alongside other supranational challenges, the number of which is constantly growing, be climate change, migration, or security.

### Figure 1: Interest in European affairs stronger than ever

Answers to the question: 'Would you say that you are very interested, fairly interested, not very interested or not at all interested in European affairs?' (%)



Evolution September 2015 / March 2017

Source: Special Eurobarometer of the European Parliament, 2017

The way that European political parties resonate in Member States would also be reinforced through more visibility and engagement around their values and views on the future of Europe.

#### Transnational lists open up new horizons for candidates and voters alike

Giving Europeans the possibility to vote for 'European' candidates does not imply that candidates anchored or rooted

in regional or national constituencies are incapable of defending European interests as well as candidates on transnational lists. And indeed, it is debatable whether any candidate can be, or should be, truly free from their regional or national roots. But, **crucially, transnational lists open up new horizons for candidates and voters alike.** Candidates have the opportunity to extract themselves from national intricacies to focus more on pressing cross-border challenges. They can interact with a larger and more diverse audience, opening them up to issues and debates that they previously may not have taken into consideration when forming their opinions, thereby enriching the European debate. At the same time, **voters gain a wider choice**, including, potentially, to support candidates representing European political parties that are not currently present in their own constituencies due to a lack of affiliated national political parties.

## The Brexit window

The European Treaties are clear: the European Parliament shall not have more than 750 members, plus the President. As often occurs when caps are set, this maximum number of seats is in fact used in full and the chances of Member States agreeing to give up any number of their national seats in favour of transnational lists are slight, to say the least.

However, **the prospect of Brexit freeing up 73 seats has significantly changed the situation.** The European Parliament's Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) has seized on this opportunity to relaunch a debate over transnational lists in the European Parliament, in a report voted on 23 January 2018.

While the Committee's discussion on European lists is not new, **what is new is the level of political support emerging in some Member States for the idea.** In September 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron gave his backing to the idea of reallocating the UK's seats to transnational lists for the 2019 elections and called for half of the European Parliament to be elected through transnational lists in the 2024 elections.<sup>9</sup> **Alongside France, six other Member States – Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain – also declared in favour of the idea** in a joint declaration on 'Bringing the EU forward in 2018' in January 2018.<sup>10</sup> **On the other hand, the leaders of the 'Visegrád Four' – i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – openly rejected the notion** of transnational lists in the upcoming 2019 elections, calling for the number of seats in the Parliament to be cut, and insisting on the need to safeguard national interests in the current voting system.<sup>11</sup>

#### Box 1: Twenty years in the making

The first references to transnational lists can be traced back to the 1999 elections, when the European Movement tabled a proposal suggesting that an additional quota of MEPs could be elected on a transnational basis.<sup>12</sup> The idea then reached the European Parliament through the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO), first with the Lamassoure-Severin report of 2007, which called for a more in-depth analysis of the potential of transnational lists,<sup>13</sup> then with more concrete proposals advanced by Andrew Duff between 2010 and 2012. The central element of the latter was that 25 MEPs would be elected by a single constituency, formed by the whole territory of the European Union, and composed of candidates

drawn from at least one third of Member States, ensuring adequate gender representation. Each elector would be able to cast one vote for the transnational list in addition to their national list. Although both reports were adopted by the AFCCO committee, neither was taken up by the plenary of the European Parliament.<sup>14</sup>

## Not without risks or challenges

Despite the multiple advantages of strengthening the European dimension of European elections, the shift to transnational lists does raise a host of questions and challenges.

### Closer to Europe but further from the citizen?

Firstly, **there is a debate as to whether focusing the electoral campaign on European issues will actually lead to candidates being further removed from the citizens.** Critics of transnational lists doubt that Europeans would actually identify with 'European' candidates, who could easily be viewed as detached from their day-to-day realities due to diverging linguistic, cultural or social-economic realities – let alone physical distance. Some believe that this risks **providing more fuel to the already rising anti-EU populist parties.** Others feel, on the other hand, that it could **foster a shift to centralism.** Or that voters' decisions would remain primarily determined by the nationality of the candidates,<sup>15</sup> thereby **giving an undue advantage to those parties in Member States with the biggest electorates.**

Of course, the latter point can be addressed in a uniform electoral law. But for the rest, it will ultimately be up to each political party and candidate to ensure that their message is suitably tailored to best appeal to their enlarged audience. And, yes, it is likely that some candidates will be privileged – namely those who are multilingual, and who are willing and flexible enough to travel to different Member States and to reach out to their electorate through innovative channels including digital and social media. But **ultimately, it would be misguided to underestimate the ability of Europeans to identify with their direct or indirect European neighbours** – in particular as more and more people study, live and work in a Member State other than their own. The very fact that EU nationals can and have been elected as local representatives in Member States of which they are not nationals testifies to this.

## Towards a two-tiered Parliament?

A partial establishment of transnational lists, in which each voter has two votes (one for the transnational list and one for the national list), would imply that the vast majority of seats continue to be decided through national constituencies. Creating such a distinction between the two lists may create a **risk of misunderstanding by some voters.** Namely, that they could vote with European issues in mind when voting for their transnational MEP, and with strictly national interests in mind when voting for their 'national' MEP.<sup>16</sup>

This misconception is not created by the introduction of transnational lists *per se*, but is rather a consequence of the pre-existing confusion generated by the European electoral system that is based on national constituencies and national political parties.<sup>17</sup> There is, nonetheless, a risk that it could be further reinforced with the presentation of two separate lists based on two different constituencies. Hence, the general need to provide voters with more transparency on the connection of national political parties and their role in European politics – and ultimately, to bolster the role of European parties in the European electoral process.<sup>18</sup>

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Finally, concerns have been expressed with regard to the equality of these two types of MEPs – the majority of which would be rooted in 'national' constituencies and could clearly be held accountable to national parties, while a small minority would not. Indeed, given that European political parties are mainly composed of national member parties rather than of individual members, some questions have been raised on how to guarantee a more democratic nomination and accountability of European candidates within the European political party framework as it currently stands.<sup>19</sup> Undoubtedly, democratic nomination and control would require member parties of European political parties to collaborate not only within the European Parliament, but in a more constant and comprehensive manner. Ultimately, though, **boosting direct membership as part of the evolution of European political parties would also greatly benefit European democracy.**

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## Devil in the detail

Based on the different proposals that have been tabled, it is possible to extract a **number of key elements** that are common to all of them and appear as intrinsic to the establishment of transnational lists: the first is the existence of a **pan-European constituency and a European electoral census**, which could be formed on the basis of the census in the different Member States. The second is the establishment of a **European Electoral Authority** to oversee the electoral process. And the third is the need for candidates on those lists to come from several Member States, although each proposal establishes different thresholds.

Important choices will still have to be made. The first major issue has to do with the number of seats to be allocated to transnational lists. Once this decision is made, there remain questions as to the **type of list – open, semi-open or closed** – as well as to the mechanisms for deciding on **candidates, levels of transnationality, rankings, seat allocation** and other conditions.

### The number of seats

Ruling out Treaty change ahead of the 2019 elections, the **options are in fact rather limited**. Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty specifies that the maximum number of MEPs cannot exceed 751, and there is certainly no desire on the part of Member States to hand over any of their national seats with a view to building a transnational list.

Therefore, **the immediate focus is on what could be achieved with the 73 seats that will be vacated post-Brexit, rather than on a broader reform**. Of course, these seats could simply be cut, moving forward with a 678-seated Parliament. They could also be set aside for potential future enlargements of the Union, or reallocated among Member States that are currently under-represented compared to their peers. They could also be assigned – in full or in part – to transnational lists.

The starting point is thus that **no more than 73 seats** – i.e. less than 10% of all MEPs – could be awarded through transnational lists in 2019. However, another factor to take into account is that the European Parliament's Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) has agreed that 27 of those seats should be reallocated among 14 Member States that are currently under-represented in the hemicycle given the size of their national population today. If one takes this reallocation into account, it follows that **a maximum of 46 seats could be used towards transnational lists** without having to change the Treaties.

*For the exercise to be at all meaningful, it would make sense to maximise the number of seats allocated to transnational lists*

Some proponents are in favour of keeping some or all of these seats aside for future enlargements. Others are calling for some or all of them to be used for transnational lists. **One median number that has emerged in this context is that of 27**. However, for the exercise to be at all meaningful, it would make sense to maximise the number of seats allocated to transnational lists and use all 46 available in 2019 – which in any case would still represent only 6% of all MEPs. Anything less would most likely be seen as rather underwhelming on the side of the voters.

### Box 2 – National thresholds and proportionality: Even a transnational MEP has a nationality

Does a transnational MEP count towards the national thresholds set out in Article 14 (2) TEU – which lays down **a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 96 seats per Member State** – and does the final selection of transnational MEPs impact on the principle of 'degressive proportionality' enshrined in the same article?

In concrete terms, if one looks at Germany, which is currently the only Member State holding 96 seats: if the country wishes to continue allocating these 96 seats through its national constituencies, does that mean that no German candidate may appear on the transnational lists? Or alternatively, should the number of national seats be reduced from 96 to take into account the number of transnational candidates with a German nationality that get elected?

The short answer is no. **If transnational lists are to be truly European lists, they must be considered to be composed of European candidates that are independent from national seats**. This is underpinned by the fact that EU citizens have the right to active and passive suffrage to the European Parliament either in their home country or in the Member State where they reside.<sup>20</sup> Thus, even candidates standing on a national list do not need to have the nationality of that country, so long as they have EU citizenship. Indeed, even at present, the German seats are not seats for Germans, but seats allocated for MEPs running for election in Germany.

Consequently, the maximum threshold does not apply on the basis of the MEP's nationality but on the basis of the national affiliation of the list from which candidates are elected. Hence, as transnational lists would be composed of **European candidates, seats assigned through transnational lists would not count towards the national seat contingent**. The same logic can be applied with regard to the principle of degressive proportionality.

## Closed, open or semi-open lists?

Typically, there are three types of lists:

- Under a **closed list** system, the order of list candidates is predefined by the political party and voters can only vote for the list as a whole. Seats are then attributed to the parties in proportion to the number of votes their list received. The order on the list determines which of the party's candidates are elected at the moment of seat allocation to the different lists.
- **Semi-open lists** are likewise ordered by the political party. However, besides having the option to vote for the list in its predefined order, the voter can alternatively express a preference vote for an individual list candidate. In this way, voters may influence the order in which the party's candidates are elected, as candidates that reach a certain quota of preference votes receive a seat regardless of their position on the list. The lower this quota is the more open is the list system.
- In systems with **open lists**, voters simply vote for individual candidates. The order in which the party's candidates are elected is thus determined by the number of votes each of them received. The order on the party list is, at most, relevant in the event of a tie vote.

**Open and semi-open lists would have the advantage of 'personalising' the elections**, creating a stronger link between the electorate and MEPs, and enabling voters to reward specific candidates according to their efforts to connect with the electorate during the campaign or on the basis of past merits.<sup>21</sup>

**These types of lists are also more likely to foster the 'transnationality' of lists** by incentivising European political parties to include candidates from as many Member States as possible to cater for their different electorates and increase prospects of success.<sup>22</sup> However, this argument, which is based on the assumption that some voters' decisions will be affected by the nationality of European candidates, also supports the theory that **candidates from Member States with a bigger electorate would be privileged by semi-open lists**.<sup>23</sup> In fact, a draft report drawn up by MEP Andrew Duff in 2009, suggesting a reform of the European Parliament electoral system based on preferential semi-open transnational lists<sup>24</sup> drew strong opposition from small and medium-sized Member States in particular.<sup>25</sup> In the end, the Committee of Constitutional Affairs opted in favour of a closed system, leaving it up to the parties to decide on the order of the list, depending on the political weight of the national parties within each European political party.<sup>26</sup>

## Reforming current European electoral law: a pre-requisite

Given the cross-border nature of transnational lists and a range of implementation options available, existing national laws will not suffice to provide adequate procedural regulation. The introduction of a joint constituency must be coupled with a reform of the current European electoral legislation, including the 1976 EU Electoral Act to establish **a uniform electoral procedure** (as is indeed permitted under Article 223 TFEU) and provide transnational lists with a solid legal basis.

At a minimum, a reform of current EU electoral legislation should:

- **Ensure the establishment of a European Electoral Authority** to monitor and control the uniform electoral procedure. Such a body could be created through a Regulation on the basis of the already existing Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations, which would receive a broadened mandate. It should be explicitly tasked with overseeing and accepting registrations of transnational lists from European political parties, verifying the legitimacy of proposals for candidates, and deciding upon their admissibility to the elections. It should also be tasked with controlling that European political parties act in accordance with the relevant legal provisions in terms of their funding and the financing of the electoral campaigns. To this effect, the parties should submit their accounts to be audited by the European Electoral Authority.
- Lay down a uniform electoral procedure, including a decision on whether European candidates will be **elected on the basis of closed, open or semi-open transnational lists**, to be monitored by the newly created European Electoral Authority.
- **Lay down minimum provisions to guarantee a certain degree of 'transnationality' of the transnational lists**. According to current proposals, candidates would have to be drawn from at least one third of the Member States. At the moment, that would mean that not less than 9 different Member States would need to be represented.
- **Define a permanent formula for the distribution of seats**. The most likely option is the use of a proportional distribution method, such as the *D'Hondt* or the *Sainte-Laguë* methods, which are already used in some Member States.<sup>27</sup>
- **Establish any other criteria and conditions that would need to be fulfilled by the lists**, e.g. gender balance, or other obligations regarding the submission of lists. In this regard, it is worth noting

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that some Member States have defined **minimum thresholds** for the elections to the European Parliament, so that candidates from political parties that fail to reach this threshold cannot be elected. This is allowed by a 2002 Council Decision, which establishes a limit of 5%.<sup>28</sup> It could, however, be argued that maintaining such minimum thresholds in a pan-European constituency would hamper the emergence of new European political parties which, through their presence in the Parliament, could gain greater support. In order to balance the legitimate interest for enhanced efficiency of decision-making with the principle of democracy, one solution could be to set **a uniform 3% threshold**.<sup>29</sup>

In order to ensure that such a European electoral reform is applicable for the next European elections, **timing is of the essence**. Indeed, in some Member States, any changes to the electoral law have to enter into force at least 12 months before election day.<sup>30</sup> In that regard, it must be noted that Article 223 (1) TFEU foresees that changes to the European electoral law must be approved by Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. This may take additional time.

## An enabling framework for European political parties to grow

The success of transnational lists largely hinges on the **ability of European political parties to become the main actors in the formation of European political awareness and the expression of Union citizens' will**. Of course, it is up to the parties themselves to ensure that this happens, but it is also possible to put in place a number of enabling measures.

For instance, while the Regulation on the statute and funding of European political parties<sup>31</sup> currently refrains from doing so, it could be worth to more clearly define core tasks that they are expected to perform to fulfil their objectives. This could serve to better underscore their democratic responsibility and clarify evolving expectations, particularly with regard to transnational lists.


At the same time, **providing meaningful debate on European issues on a continental scale and campaigning 'transnationally' will come along with increased expenditures for European political parties**. In order to fulfill their task, they will require sufficient funding.<sup>32</sup> This may indeed require the amendment of the EU Regulation on European Political

Parties, which at the moment limits the possibility of spending on election campaigns.<sup>33</sup> It would appear reasonable to foresee that a certain share of European political party funding be earmarked for transnational campaigns. Beyond that, European political parties could also be strengthened further by boosting their direct individual membership in the longer term. One idea could be to link more clearly the funding of European political parties at the EU level with numbers of individual members, or even the degree of transnationality of their members, further incentivising the transnational orientation of European political parties.<sup>34</sup>

### Ticking clock

Even with all the will in the world, a shift towards transnational lists cannot happen by 2019 without a certain number of decisions and procedural steps being taken in the imminent future (Figure 2). Creating a **joint constituency** to elect transnational lists then entails an amendment of the 1976 Act introducing direct elections. This requires **a unanimous Council Decision**,<sup>35</sup> with the consent of the Parliament given by absolute majority. **Some Member States, as well as the Venice Commission, require that any changes in electoral law be made at least a year before the elections take place, i.e. by May 2018** in order to be in time for the May 2019 elections. A Regulation on the Electoral Law would also be needed to lay down the details of the electoral procedure to be followed in the joint constituency. Furthermore, the creation of a **European Electoral Authority** would mean amending Regulation No 1141/2014 on the statute of European political parties to replace the existing Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations.

Figure 2: Timeline for implementation in view of the 2019 elections



## Conclusions: a high-risk, high-reward innovation?

While transnational lists hold **undeniable potential** to enhance the dual source of democratic legitimacy in the EU, they also raise serious questions in relation to established practices within the Union and its Member States. They are likely to have a **disruptive impact**, leading to the re-examination of the ways in which European politics is played out. This is, however, always true of institutional innovations, especially at the EU level, where complexity is naturally greater.

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**The promise of transnational lists is powerful.** At the time of the EU's rebirth in a smaller circle, they can provide an organic impulse for more genuine debate about European issues in the election campaign and beyond. The departure of the United Kingdom provides a unique opportunity to reflect on whether the EU is ready for a project like this. As in breakthrough innovation, however, one will not know the outcome in advance. Political leaders will need to judge whether they are prepared for what would be a genuine experiment. In either case, they will need to make the most out of the option they choose.

## Notes

1. Standard Eurobarometer 88, Autumn 2017
2. Article 14(2) 1 TEU
3. S. Hix and M. Marsh, Second-order effects plus pan-European political swings: An analysis of European Parliament elections across time, *Electoral Studies* 30 (2011) 4–15; For each Member State in the 2014 elections: L. De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele and N. Maggini, *The European Parliament Elections of 2014*, CISE (Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali), Rome.
4. <http://andrewduff.blogactiv.eu/2017/09/10/is-the-european-parliament-really-a-serious-parliament/>
5. See a similar provision in the German law on political parties, Article 21(1) German Constitution (Grundgesetz) and Article 1 (2) Parteiengesetz.
6. Sarah B. Hobolt and Jae-Jae Spoon, 'Motivating the European voter: Parties, issues and campaigns in European Parliament elections' *European Journal of Political Research* 2012 (51) pp. 701–727, at 709; Derek Beach, Kasper M. Hansen and Martin V. Larsen, 'How Campaigns Enhance European Issues Voting During European Parliament Elections', *Political Science Research and Methods* 2017, p. 1–18.
7. European Parliament, 'Two years until the 2019 European elections, Special Eurobarometer of the European Parliament' 2017, p. 13.
8. European Commission, '35 years of Eurobarometer, European integration as seen by public opinion in the Member States of the European Union: 1973 – 2008', p. 13.
9. For instance in the Sorbonne speech of President Emmanuel Macron on 26.09.2018.
10. Declaration 'Bringing the EU forward in 2018' issued at the Southern European Summit, Rome, 10 January 2018. The countries signing the declaration were Republic of Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain.
11. V4 Statement on the Future of Europe, January 2018. Specifically, they state: 'transnational lists of Members of the European Parliament to be elected at European level could strengthen the democratic dimension of the Union'.
12. L. Donatelli, 'A Pan-European District for the European Elections? The Rise and Fall of the Duff Proposal for the Electoral Reform of the European Parliament', *Bruges Political Research Papers* 44/2015, p. 10.
13. Alain Lamassoure and Adrian Severin, Report on the composition of the European Parliament (2007/2169(INI)), 3.10.2007, p. 6.
14. The Spinelli Group's project for a fundamental law of the European Union also proposes that a part of MEPs are elected on the basis of a pan-European constituency. See The Spinelli Group, *A Fundamental Law of the European Union*, 2013, Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, pp. 17 and 36.
15. For instance: MEP György Schöpflin (EPP) in the Meeting of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs on 11 September 2017.
16. Jouvena, P., 'Transnational Lists: A False Good Idea', 15 September 2017, <https://www.thenewfederalist.eu/transnational-lists-a-false-good-idea>.
17. For each Member State in the 2014 elections: Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele and Nicola Maggini, *The European Parliament Elections of 2014*, CISE (Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali), Rome.
18. Suggestions in this regard have been presented by the Parliament resolution of 11 November 2015 on the reform of the electoral law of the European Union (2015/2035(INL)).
19. For instance: MEP György Schöpflin (EPP) in the Meeting of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs on 11 September 2017.
20. See Art. 22 (2) TFUE.
21. Ken Ritchie, 'Which electoral procedures seem appropriate for a multi-level polity?' (European Parliament - Directorate General Internal Policies of the Union, Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs) April 2008, p. 7, 8.
22. Rainer Stentzel, Integrationsziel Parteiendemokratie, Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für eine Demokratisierung der Europäischen Union' (Nomos 2002) p. 401.
23. Lorenzo Donatelli, 'A Pan-European District for the European Elections? The Rise and Fall of the Duff Proposal for the Electoral Reform of the European Parliament' *Bruges Political Research Papers* 2015 (44), p. 36.
24. Committee on Constitutional Affairs (Rapporteur: Andrew Duff), Draft Report on a proposal for a modification of the Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976 (2009/2134(INI)) [5.11.2010].
25. *ibid.*, p. 37.
26. Committee on Constitutional Affairs (Rapporteur: Andrew Duff), Report on a proposal for a modification of the Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976 (2009/2134(INI)) [28.04.2011].
27. The D'Hondt method is currently used by 16 Member States for the European Parliament elections, as well as in the European Parliament itself to distribute committee chairs and other posts among political groups. Following this method each list's total number of votes is repeatedly divided, by 1+ the number of seats that have already been allocated. Through each division, an average is produced and hence it is the list with the highest average who is awarded the seat, until all seats have been allocated. It is this method that is proposed in the Committee on Constitutional Affairs' (Rapporteur: Andrew Duff) Second Report on a proposal for a modification of the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976 (2009/2134(INI)) [1.2.2012]. For the Sainte-Laguë method, see: Report proposing a European electoral reform (n 7).
28. Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom of 25 June and 23 September 2002 amending the Act of 20 September 1976 concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage.
29. This is the case of the French proposal, which suggests the application of the D'Hont method for allocation of seats in connection with a 3% threshold.
30. Danuta Hübner on behalf of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Question for oral answer to the Council, Subject: Reform of the electoral law of the EU [14 December 2017]; on the possibility that the French Council of State would declare the European elections in France void if there would be no transparency and certainty about the attribution of seats one year before the elections: MEP Jérôme Lavrilleux in the Meeting of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs on 11 September 2017.
31. Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations.
32. See section IV. 3) on the revision of funding provisions as one necessary step on the road to transnational lists.
33. See Articles 17 to 22 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 1141/2014.
34. *Ibid.*
35. on the basis of Article 223(1) TFEU